This paper examines whether house demolitions are an effective counterterrorism tactic against suicide terrorism. We link original longitudinal micro-level data on houses demolished by the Israeli Defense Forces with data on the universe of suicide attacks against Israeli targets. By exploiting spatial and time variation in house demolitions and suicide terror attacks during the second Palestinian uprising, we show that punitive house demolitions (those targeting Palestinian suicide terrorists and terror operatives) cause an immediate, significant decrease in the number of suicide attacks. The effect dissipates over time and by geographic distance. In contrast, we observe that precautionary house demolitions (demolitions justified by the location of the house but not related to the identity or any action of the house's owner) cause a significant increase in the number of suicide terror attacks. The results are consistent with the view that selective violence is an effective tool to combat terrorist groups, whereas indiscriminate violence backfires.
Introduction
Although it is commonly argued that government policies to deter terrorism and disrupt the operations of terror organizations tend to be effective (Ganor, 2005) , alternative theoretical models suggest that they may have a boomerang effect. According to this view, harsh measures of counterterrorism backfire by fostering hatred and attempts to exact revenge (Siqueira and Sandler, 2006) . In particular, while counterterrorism policies typically affect the general population, the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies depends on their ability to target terror organizations directly. 1 However, despite the wide interest that counterterrorism policies draw and the abundance of related theoretical studies, there is little empirical evidence on the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures. Assessing the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies requires detailed micro-level data on terror attacks and counterterrorism operations. Unfortunately, such detailed data are typically not publicly available.
This paper attempts to fill this gap by linking novel micro-level data on house demolitions (a policy used by the Israeli Defense Forces [IDF] to combat and deter terrorism) and suicide attacks, empirically documenting the effects of house demolitions on future suicide attacks. We differentiate between the two main types of house demolitions carried out by the IDF: precautionary demolitions and punitive house demolitions. Precautionary demolitions are intended to prevent the launching of attacks from specific locations and are not related to activities carried out by the owners or occupants of the houses being demolished. In contrast, in punitive house demolitions, the IDF demolishes or seals houses that were home to Palestinian suicide terrorists or to individuals suspected, detained, or convicted of involvement in violent acts against Israelis.
Our analysis is based on original micro-level data. We use a longitudinal micro-level data set containing information on all punitive house demolitions during the second Palestinian uprising as well as all precautionary house demolitions between 2004 and 2005 . For each house demolished we know the exact location of the house, the timing of the demolition, the house's size, and the number of its residents. We link this data set with data on the universe of suicide terrorists during the same time period, including each terrorist's timing of the attack and locality 1 See, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) . of residence. We augment our data with localities' specific economic and demographic data, as well as with longitudinal variation of other counterterrorism measures imposed by the IDF. This detailed data set allows us to use time and spatial variation to identify and quantify the effectiveness of house demolitions as a deterrence policy of counterterrorism.
We find that punitive house demolitions lead to fewer suicide attacks in the month following the demolitions. The effect of house demolition is significant and sizeable-a standard deviation increase in punitive house demolitions leads to a decrease of 11.7 percent in the number of suicide terrorists originating from an average district. Intriguingly, we find that in contrast to the deterrent effect of punitive house demolitions, precautionary demolitions (which are not related to activities of the houses' owners and occupants) are associated with more suicide attacks. In particular, our estimates show that a standard deviation increase in precautionary house demolitions leads to a 48.7 percent increase in the number of suicide terrorists from an average district.
Our results are robust to alternative measures of house demolitions, such as the number of housing units demolished, number of residents affected, and the area size of demolished houses.
The results are also robust to different specifications including a battery of control variables, counterterrorism measures, and fixed effects. Moreover, we examine the robustness of our results under alternative counterfactuals, estimate the persistence of the effects, and test whether these effects change directions over time.
The results indicate that, when targeted correctly, counterterrorism measures such as house demolitions provide the desired deterrent effect. When used indiscriminately, however, house demolitions lead to the radicalization of the population and backfire, resulting in more subsequent attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights the institutional details of house demolitions. Section 3 surveys related literature on counterterrorism policies. Section 4 describes the data and summary statistics. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis, and the last section concludes.
House Demolitions: Background
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The Israel Defense Forces carries out two main types of house demolitions: house demolitions in "clearing operations" and punitive house demolitions. The second type of demolition is "punitive house demolitions." In punitive house demolitions, the IDF demolishes or seals houses that were home to Palestinians suspected of, detained in connection with, or convicted of involvement in violent acts against Israelis, regardless of the results. These acts include suicide bombings that caused many civilian fatalities as well as thwarted attacks against soldiers or civilians. The demolished houses belong not only to perpetrators but to individuals accused of involvement in an attack, either by planning it, dispatching the perpetrators, or providing assistance to the responsible terrorist cell. We have data on all punitive house demolitions between the years 2000 and 2005.
The Evolution of House Demolitions: From 1945 to the Second Intifada
The policy of house demolitions in the region began during the British Mandate. In 1945 the acting British high commissioner for Palestine enacted emergency defense regulations that 2 This section draws mostly on Darcy (2003) and Shnayderman (2004) . 3 A third type of demolition is administrative house demolitions of houses built without a building permit. These demolitions occur almost exclusively in East Jerusalem and are not related to security concerns. We do not include administrative house demolitions in our analysis because they are not security related, there is not geographic variation of these demolitions, and there are no good micro-level data on them.
granted authorities the power to conduct searches, make arrests, establish military courts to try civilians without right of appeal, close off areas, deport individuals, impose curfews, and demolish houses. In particular, regulation 119(1) allowed the military to seize and destroy houses, structures, and land as punishment for illegal acts.
The Israeli security forces began conducting punitive house demolitions in 1967, right after the Six Days' War, and demolished almost 1,400 houses in the late 1960s. Although the policy remained in place, punitive house demolitions were rare from the early 1970s until 1987.
With the beginning of the first Intifada in December 1987, the IDF significantly increased the use of punitive house demolitions to punish and deter further acts of violence, resulting in almost 500 demolitions in the years 1988-1992. There were only a few house demolitions between 1993 and 1997, and the policy was discontinued from 1998 until September 2001.
In response to the wave of violence of the second Intifada that began in October 2000, the IDF informally renewed punitive house demolitions. The first house demolished during the second Intifada belonged to a Palestinian suicide bomber who killed 21 Israelis when he blew himself up in a discotheque in Tel Aviv. 4 The political-security cabinet of the Israeli government officially renewed the policy of punitive demolitions on July 31, 2002, right after a terror attack at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem killed nine Israelis.
The use of house demolitions as a counterterrorism tool has been hotly debated inside and outside of Israel. Several human rights organizations have repeatedly challenged its legality. In cases argued before the Israeli Supreme Court of Justice, these organizations have asserted that the policy of house demolitions constitutes a war crime because it punishes innocent individuals for acts committed by others (Darcy, 2003) .
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In defense of this policy, Israeli officials repeatedly argue that the policy of house demolitions falls within the exception to article 53 of the fourth Geneva Convention. According to the IDF, the demolition of houses of terrorists and terror operatives is a crucial counterterrorism tool for deterring terrorism in general and suicide terrorism in particular. The Supreme Court of Justice has repeatedly declined to interfere with the IDF's operational military considerations (Nabot, 2003) .
The Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Policies: Related Literature
Although the policy of house demolition has been vigorously debated in political and legal arenas, there are no systematic studies ascertaining whether house demolitions are effective in stopping terrorism in general and suicide terrorism in particular (Harel and Isacharoff, 2004 Berman and Laitin (2008) , and Sandler (1993, 2004) . The related theoretical literature on counterterrorism takes terror groups' strategic reaction into account for the design of efficient counterterror policies (see, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita (2007) and Powell (2007a Powell ( , 2007b ).
Data
We use a novel data set on houses demolished between the years 2000 and 2005 as well as data containing the universe of Palestinians suicide terrorists during the same time period. We augment these data with information on other counterterrorism measures, as well as economic and demographic characteristics of Palestinian localities.
Our data on house demolitions were obtained from B'Tselem, a nongovernmental Israeli human rights organization that monitors and collects data on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Although several studies have used B'Tselem's data on Israeli and Palestinian fatalities, ours is the first to use B'Tselem's detailed micro-data on house demolitions. In the bottom panel of Table 1 we present data on suicide terrorists, Israeli fatalities, and
Palestinian fatalities. The data on Palestinian suicide terrorists were constructed by Benmelech and Berrebi (2007) As expected, the number of punitive demolitions is highly correlated with the number of suicide terrorists. That is, we observe a yearly increase in the number of suicide terrorists up until 2002 and a monotonic decrease after that peak for all subsequent years. We observe similar patterns of the evolution of violence when we focus on the fluctuations of Israeli and Palestinian fatalities over time.
The spatial heterogeneity of suicide terrorists and punitive house demolitions is illustrated in Figure 1 . Listed in parentheses are both the number of suicide terrorists who originated from (first number) and the number of punitive house demolitions carried out in each of the ten districts in the West Bank, the five districts in the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem (second number).
There is a high geographic variation with respect to the district of origin of suicide terrorists and of corresponding house demolitions, especially in the West Bank. Some districts are violent (Jenin, Nablus, Bethlehem, and Hebron), with a high number of suicide terrorists and punitive house demolitions, while other districts are fairly calm (Tubas, Jericho, and Salfit).
Districts in the Gaza Strip are more homogenous than those in the West Bank in terms of the number of both suicide terrorists and punitive house demolitions. Table 2 refines the geographical description of Figure 1 by reporting summary statistics on the number of suicide terrorists originating from a locality, the number of Israeli-induced
Palestinian fatalities, and the number of house demolitions for each locality in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
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Violence varied substantially across localities. The average number of suicide terrorists originating from a locality is 0.218. Forty-three of the 683 localities had at least one suicide terrorist, and the maximum number of suicide terrorists originating from a locality (Nablus) is 30. The average number of Israeli-induced Palestinian fatalities is 4.9, and the maximum is 490
(Ashati Refugee camp in the Gaza district). There are 0.9 punitive house demolitions in the average locality affecting 5.96 residents. Table 3 restricts the sample to the 43 localities from which at least one suicide terrorist originated. The average number of suicide terrorists per locality in this subsample is 3.5, and the median is 2. There were on average 63.5 Israeli-induced Palestinian fatalities in these localities.
The average number of punitive house demolitions is 10.63, and the average number of precautionary house demolitions is 25.58. Likewise, about 70 local residents were directly affected by punitive demolitions within a locality, and on average 239.5 residents were directly affected by precautionary demolitions during the period at issue.
In our empirical estimation we augment the data on suicide bombers and house demolitions with economic and demographic variables from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey (PLFS) of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 10 Table 4 displays summary statistics of the economic and demographic variables of interest for all districts and provides a general overview of Palestinian economic and demographic conditions during second Intifada. We observe a relatively young population with low average years of schooling and a low unemployment rate due largely to extremely low labor force participation.
In the bottom row of Table 4 we report summary statistics on the number of curfews days per district per quarter. The data on curfews was obtained from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 11 OCHA provided data on total hours under curfew by district by month between May 2002 and December 2005. Over this period, the average number of curfew days in a month within a district was 1.341, and the maximum was 4.6 days (in Hebron).
The Effect of House Demolitions on the Number of Suicide Attacks
Empirical Framework
To test the relationship between house demolitions and the number of suicide terrorists we focus on district-month cells (or localities-month cells). Our baseline regressions identify the effect of house demolitions within a district on future suicide attacks originating from that district. Given that the number of attacks originated from a district at a particular month is a nonnegative integer, we estimate Poisson regression models.
Formally, we estimate different variants of the following baseline specification:
where suicide terrorists i,t is the number of suicide terrorists that originate from district i in month t; HD i,t-1 is the number of punitive house demolitions in district i in month t-1; and x i,t-1 represents the other explanatory variables in the model that are used to control for potentially confounding factors. These include Israeli-induced Palestinian fatalities, demographic and economic characteristics, and Israeli security measures that vary across districts and time, all of which are listed in Table 4 . λ i is a district fixed effect that controls for districts' unobservable characteristics that are time-invariant; γ t is a year fixed effect that absorbs common fluctuations of violence over time. Hence, by including fixed effects for each district and year, we essentially examine whether variation over time in punitive house demolitions within a district is correlated with variation over time within a district of suicide terror attacks, while controlling for the common trend in violence across districts and a rich set of districts' characteristics. In some of the specifications in the tables below we include district-specific time trends, thus showing that the results are robust to an alternative identifying assumption. Last, in all specifications we cluster the error term at the district level to capture nonsystematic determinants of the number of suicide terrorists.
Main Results
We present the results from estimating the impact of punitive house demolitions on the number of suicide terrorists from the same district in subsequent months in Table 5 . We estimate a panel Poisson model controlling-depending on the specification-for district fixed effects, year fixed effects, district-specific linear time trends, and districts' economic and demographic characteristics (unemployment, percentage employed in Israel, average years of schooling, average age, and fraction of males and married individuals in the district's population). In some specifications we also control for other security-related measures (in addition to house demolitions) for which data are available: (1) the number of Israeli-induced Palestinian fatalities, and (2) the number of days with a curfew.
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The effect of punitive house demolitions on the number of suicide terrorists is not statistically significant when we only control separately for either district or year fixed effects (Columns 1-3). In fact, without controlling for district fixed effects, we observe a positive correlation between punitive house demolitions and number of suicide terrorists. This result is likely to be caused by an omitted variable bias, since more violent districts obviously have more punitive house demolitions and a higher number of suicide terrorists. Nonetheless, a naive interpretation of this positive correlation is sometimes being used in public discourse as proof that house demolitions backfire.
When we control for district fixed effects (to account for unobserved underlying heterogeneity across districts) and year fixed effects (to account for common fluctuations over time of the variables of interest), we see that punitive house demolitions in a given district significantly decrease the number of suicide terrorists who originate from that district. This effect is not only statistically significant but of an important magnitude. In particular, the estimated rate ratio implies that the marginal punitive house demolition lowers the number of suicide terrorists originating from a district in the following month by a factor of 0.941. This effect implies that a standard deviation increase in the number of punitive house demolitions (which is equal to 2.04) causes a decrease of 11.7 percent in the number of suicide terrorists originating from an average district-month cell.
The negative effect of punitive house demolitions on the number of subsequent suicide terrorists is qualitatively and quantitatively robust to the inclusion of additional controls, such as demographic and economic characteristics (Column 5), as well as other proxies for the security situation at the district level (Column 7). Moreover, when we include district-specific time trends, the result (Column 6) is also robust to different identifying assumptions that are based on deviations of house demolitions and the number of suicide terrorists from districts' specific trends (and not only the districts' averages, as in the other columns).
In Table 6 we repeat the same specifications of Columns 4 to 7 in Table 5 but focus on the other available measures for the severity of house demolitions. The results confirm that the main conclusions from Table 5 We analyze the data using both district-month and locality-month aggregations. Tables 7   and 8 repeat the regressions in Tables 5 and 6 , respectively, focusing on locality-month cells instead of district-month cells. That is, Tables 7 and 8 are based on more refined micro-level data. The data set that focuses on localities is more detailed and hence the estimation is more precise than when using district-level data. Once we introduce locality fixed effects, however, the estimates rely only on the 43 localities in which least one suicide terrorist originated (out of 683 localities). Hence, by comparing the results from both district-month and locality-month aggregations, we make sure that the results are not unduly affected by the elimination from the sample of localities in which suicide attacks did not originate.
We see a similar pattern in Tables 7 and 8 to the one found using data at the district level.
That is, punitive house demolitions are shown to have a significant deterrent effect on suicide terrorists also when using data at the locality level. Remarkably, even the point estimates are of almost the same magnitude as those in Tables 5 and 6 . While measured at the locality level, a one standard deviation increase in punitive house demolitions causes a decrease of 14.9 percent on the odds of that a suicide terrorist originated from that locality within a month of the demolitions. This effect is higher than the one observed when data is aggregated at the district level (11.7 percent). As we show in subsection 5.4 below, the difference is explained by the spatial dissipation of the deterrent effect of punitive house demolitions.
In Table   A .2).
Dynamic Effects of Punitive House Demolitions
The previous section established that punitive house demolitions led to an immediate decline in suicide terrorism-within one month after the demolition. This section examines the persistency of the deterrent effect of house demolitions. We study the persistency of house demolitions over six months using a series of six Poisson regressions. That is, for each of the four available measures for house demolitions we use the specification in Column 5 of Table 5 , except that each regression uses a different lag of house demolitions, which varies from one to six months. Figure 2 presents the estimated coefficients as well as 90 percent confidence bands.
The figure shows that the effect of punitive house demolitions, though significant a month after their occurrence, fades away over time. That is, the pattern of coefficients consistently shows for the four measures a negative and significant effect of house demolitions within a one-month lag and an almost monotonic convergence to zero for higher-order lags. Note also that the effect of punitive house demolitions is not statistically different from zero from a lag of two months and onward, indicating that the deterrent effect of house demolitions basically disappears after one month of their occurrence.
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One concern that arises from the findings in Figure 2 is that the short-lived effect of house demolitions is in fact caused by other counterterrorism measures that the IDF imposes on the terrorists' localities of origin after suicide attacks. For example, after a suicide attack the IDF may choose not only to demolish the house of the perpetrator but also to impose curfews, closures, and roadblocks while also increasing military presence in the area. Although we are able to control for curfews and Israeli-induced Palestinian fatalities, we do not have information on all other possible counterterrorism measures.
The analysis in Table 9 directly addresses the concern that confounding factors prevalent in the aftermath of a terror attack are behind the observed impact of punitive house demolitions on suicide terrorism. In this analysis, we eliminate from the data set all locality-month cells in which the IDF demolishes a house within a month of a suicide attack in direct retaliation for the attack.
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The results of this analysis show that the significant negative effect of house demolitions on the number of suicide terrorists is not caused exclusively by immediate house demolitions after a terror attack. The estimated coefficients are statistically significant and only slightly lower in magnitude when compared to the coefficients estimated using the universe of suicide terrorists (Tables 7 and 8 ).
An alternative concern is that strategic considerations of terror cells may cause a decrease in suicide terrorism after a suicide attack. For example, the dynamics of suicide terrorism may be such that a terror cell imposes a period of relative calm, a strategy of "laying low," after a successful terror attack. The results show that recent suicide terror attacks do not systematically affect future attacks. The coefficients on contemporaneous suicide attacks are not consistently significant across different specifications, and they even change sign when we control for other measures of counterterrorism. Importantly, however, the coefficients on house demolitions remain highly statistically significant and of the same magnitude as those estimated in Tables 5 and 6 . Hence, the message that emerges from Tables 9 and 10 and Figure 2 is that punitive house demolitions have a significant, albeit short-lived, negative impact on the number of suicide terrorists.
Geographic Effects of Punitive House Demolitions
In this section we analyze the geographic dispersion of the effect of punitive house demolitions on suicide terrorism. To that end, we study whether house demolitions in a neighboring district have an effect on local suicide terrorism. That is, we add to the specifications in Columns 6 and 7 of Table 5 an additional covariate with the number of punitive house demolitions in the rest of the districts in the same region.
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We find that the effects of house demolitions dissipate not only over time but also across geographic distance (Table 11) . Accordingly, the effects of local punitive house demolitions on the number of local suicide terrorists are still negative and statistically significant. However, punitive house demolitions in other districts in the same region do not have a significant impact on the number of suicide terrorists.
The Effects of Precautionary House Demolitions
Here we study the effects of precautionary house demolitions on suicide terrorism. As mentioned in section 2, precautionary house demolitions refer to houses demolished in "clearing operations" intended to meet military needs. For houses demolished for punitive reasons, the IDF directly links the owner and/or occupant of the house to terror activity against Israel. That is, there is a direct link between an individual's action and the resulting punishment. In contrast, for houses demolished for precautionary reasons, the IDF does not claim an existing connection between the house occupant and terror activity. Hence, there is no connection between the individual's actions and the resulting demolition of the house. In fact, the main determinant of precautionary house demolitions is whether the house is located near the Egyptian or Israeli borders or surrounding an Israeli settlement or roads used by settlers. Following Kalyvas's (2006) classification of types of violence, we view punitive house demolitions as a form of selective violence and precautionary house demolitions as a form of indiscriminate violence.
We test the effectiveness of precautionary house demolitions in Table 12 . The models estimated include, in addition to precautionary house demolitions, the same controls used in Column 7 in Table 5 . 16 The 
Conclusions
This paper presents the first systematic examination of the effectiveness of house demolitions using a novel micro-level data set. Our analysis shows that punitive house demolitions, a selective policy of counterterrorism, lead to an immediate decrease in the number of suicide terrorists. This effect dissipates over time and space. In contrast to punitive house demolitions, precautionary house demolitions, which can be likened to an indiscriminate policy of counterterrorism, lead to a significance increase in the number of suicide terror attacks against
Israeli citizens.
While we find that punitive house demolitions are an effective tool to deter suicide terrorism, it may not be an efficient policy because it may cause some undesirable consequences. Notes: Estimated via panel Poisson regression model. Dependent variable is the number of suicide terror attacks originating in district i at month t. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the district level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level; ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level. Table 5 . Other proxies for counterterrorism are Israeli-induced Palestinian fatalities and curfews, as used in specifications 3 and 6 in Table 5 . Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the district level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level; ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level. Table 5 . Other proxies for counterterrorism are Israeli-induced Palestinian fatalities and curfews, as used in specifications 3 and 6 in Table 5 . Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the district level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level; ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level. Table 5 . Other proxies for counterterrorism are Israeliinduced Palestinian fatalities and curfews, as used in specifications 3 and 6 in Table 5 . Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the district level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level; ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level. is the number of suicide terror attacks originating in locality i at month t. All specifications control for economic and demographic conditions, other proxies for counterterrorism, district fixed effects and years fixed effects as in specification 7 in Table 5 . Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the district level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level; ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level. All data aggregated at the district level Using data at the locality level Sources: Authors' calculations using house demolition and fatality data from B'Tselem, suicide terrorism data from ISA, economic and demographic characteristics data from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey, and curfews data from UN OCHA. The data set covers the period October 2000 to December 2005.
Number of Residents in Demolished Houses
Notes:
Each column in each panel presents the results of a different regression estimated via panel Negative Binomial regression model. Dependent variable is the suicide terror attacks originating in district i at month t. The economic and demographic controls are the same ones used in specifications 2, 3, 5, and 6 in Table 5 . Other proxies for counterterrorism are Israeli-induced Palestinian fatalities and curfews, as used in specifications 3 and 6 in Table 5 . Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the district level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level; ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level. 
